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ABSTRACT
We identify a novel, fiscal hedging motive that helps to explain why governments issue more
expensive, long-term debt. We analyze optimal fiscal policy in an economy with distortionary labor
income taxes, nominal rigidities and nominal debt of various maturities. The government in our
model can smooth labor tax rates by changing the real return it pays on its outstanding liabilities.
These changes require state contingent inflation or adjustments in the nominal term structure. In the
presence of nominal pricing rigidities and a cash in advance constraint, these changes are themselves
distortionary. We show that long term nominal debt can help a government hedge fiscal shocks by
spreading out and delaying the distortions associated with increases in nominal interest rates over
the maturity of the outstanding long-term debt. After a positive spending shock, the government


















Governments have traditionally ¯nanced their spending by raising taxes and selling nominal bonds
of varied maturities. An old debate concerns the best way for a government to manage the maturity
structure of these liabilities. Barro (2002) and Campbell (1995) argue that the government should
issue short rather than long term nominal debt, because the persistent nature of in°ation makes
the real holding return on the former less volatile than the holding return on the latter. Hence,
a government that issues short term nominal debt reduces its own risk exposure as well as that
of bond investors. In the process, it economizes on the risk premium it pays to investors. These
arguments treat in°ation and nominal interest rates exogenously.
In this paper, we explore optimal maturity management in a fully speci¯ed general equilibrium
model in which the only exogenous elements are shocks (to government spending) and all prices
are endogenously determined. We ¯nd that the optimal policy entails the exclusive use of the
longest term debt available coupled with an appropriate management of nominal bond prices and
interest rates. The nominal price of outstanding bonds is reduced after unexpectedly large shocks
to government spending, by the anticipation of higher, future short rates. Consequently, optimal
policy departs from the Friedman rule. Consistent with Barro and Campbell's observations, this
policy implies a more volatile ex post real holding return on long term debt relative to short term.
However, this volatility is deliberate and managed so as to hedge the ¯scal risk the government
faces. We argue that the risk premium paid to investors is more like an insurance premium from
the government's perspective.
In our model the government ¯nances its activities by selling nominal debt of various maturities,
altering the real return on this debt, printing money and levying taxes on income. These taxes
distort the labor-consumption margin and, as in many models, the government would like to smooth
their path across dates and states via the trading of debt and via state-contingent alterations in the
real return that it pays on its debt. Since we assume that the government can only sell debt with
a non-contingent nominal return, it cannot deliver state-contingent variations in the real return
directly. Instead, it must do so indirectly through contemporaneous in°ation or through variations
2in the nominal term structure. In particular, the government may hedge a positive government
spending shock by devaluing its nominal liabilities through an immediate in°ation or through higher
expected future in°ation and higher future short run nominal interest rates1, which in turn reduce
the price of outstanding longer term debt today.
We introduce two nominal rigidities that render variations in in°ation and nominal debt prices
costly. First, we assume that some ¯rms set their prices before the realization of the current state.
This rigidity implies that contemporaneous state-contingent in°ations are associated with a misal-
location of production, and labor supply, across sticky and °exible price ¯rms. Absent this rigidity,
optimal policy would fully hedge ¯scal shocks through contemporaneous in°ations that appropri-
ately adjust the real value of the government's nominal liabilities. With the rigidity, the government
must trade the bene¯ts from hedging against the production distortion that state-contingent in-
°ations induce. Second, we also assume that households face a cash-in-advance constraint applied
to some goods (cash goods), but not others (credit goods). Consequently, deviations in nominal
interest rates from zero distort consumption bundles as households substitute credit for cash goods
in an e®ort to economize on cash. The bene¯ts of hedging achieved through variations in nominal
debt prices must be traded o® against the costs stemming from this second distortion. In summary,
variable income tax rates, contemporaneous state-contingent in°ations and deviations in nominal
interest rates from zero are all costly. The task of the government is to implement a ¯scal-monetary
policy that minimizes the joint distortions from each of these sources.
In our model, the optimal policy prescribes the use of the longest maturity debt available. While
all nominal debt helps with the smoothing of income tax rates and the labor-consumption wedge,
long term nominal debt helps with the management of the other wedges as well. Reductions in the
nominal value of the government's liabilities in the aftermath of a ¯scal shock involve positive short
term interest rates and corresponding distortions to the cash-credit good margin over the term
of these liabilities. Long run debt is useful because it allows the government to postpone these
positive interest rates and costly distortions until further into the future. After an unanticipated
increase in government spending, the short term nominal interest rate is gradually increased until
3the initially outstanding debt reaches maturity. In other words, the yield curve is shifted upward
and it becomes steeper, up until the largest outstanding maturity.
Our paper follows the Ramsey tradition of placing exogenous restrictions on the set of policy
instruments available to the government. Our central restriction, in addition to the standard
assumption of a linear income tax, is that the government can only trade debt with a non-contingent
nominal return. This assumption has, of course, been widely made in the literature, because,
historically, these are the securities that governments have issued. 2 We augment it with a second
restriction: that the government cannot lend to households.3 We discuss the role and theoretical
basis for this second assumption in Sections II and VI of the paper. Both assumptions are motivated
by empirical considerations. Governments have historically sold non-contingent nominal debt of
various maturities. Thus, these assumptions allow our model to make closer contact with the data.4
Two recent contributions provide empirical evidence that a hedging motive may in°uence the
conduct of nominal interest rate policy. In Lustig, Sleet and Yeltekin (2004), we ¯nd evidence that
exogenous ¯scal shocks do predict higher future nominal yields in post-war US data. In particular,
we focus on shocks to the present discounted value of US defense spending. Further corroboration
is also provided by Dai and Philippon (2004). Their VAR analysis indicates that shocks to the
government de¯cit lead to subsequent increases in long term interest rates.5 Both sets of facts are
consistent with the optimal policy prescribed by our model.
The plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows. After a brief review of the literature, we
outline the model in Section II. In Section III, we characterize competitive allocations. Sections
IV and V give Ramsey problems for our environment and for a benchmark complete markets
environment. In Section VI we discuss the role of the no lending constraints. We provide a
simple example in Section VII that provides intuition and for which a partial analytical solution
is available. Section VIII provides a recursive formulation for the general problem, while Section
IX implements this formulation numerically and computes optimal policy in several parameterized
examples. Finally, Section X concludes.
4A. Related literature
The literature on optimal ¯scal and monetary policy has made various assumptions about the asset
market structure confronting the government. In the benchmark complete markets model, it is
optimal for the government to use state-contingent claims to hedge ¯scal shocks (see Lucas and
Stokey, 1983). This hedging can be achieved via many di®erent portfolios of claims. Angeletos
(2002), Barro (1995) and Buera and Nicolini (2004) consider governments restricted to trading
non-contingent real debt of di®erent maturities. In these models the government can use state-
contingent variations in the price of longer term real debt to hedge shocks. Angeletos shows that if
the set of traded debt maturities is large enough, the government can (almost) achieve the optimal
complete markets allocation; when it is not too large, the optimal maturity structure, if it exists,
is unique. However, Buera and Nicolini show that it may entail very large asset market positions.
We contrast our analysis with these papers in Section VI.
Bohn (1988) points out that a government can hedge ¯scal shocks by combining one period
nominal debt with a state-contingent monetary policy that induces appropriate variations in the
price level. He assumes that variations in in°ation are costless. In contrast, Schmitt-Groh¶ e and
Uribe (SU) (2004) and Siu (2004) introduce frictions that render state-contingent in°ations distor-
tionary. Consequently, a government must trade the costs of state-contingent in°ations o® against
their hedging bene¯ts. Both SU and Siu show that at moderate levels of debt the in°ation costs
dominate; it is desirable to have a fairly stable in°ation rate with little variation in the real return
paid on debt.
Our model is closest to that of SU and, especially, Siu. Like them we assume that state-
contingent in°ations are costly. Unlike them, we allow the government to trade nominal debt of more
than one period maturity. Thus, we are able to consider the optimal nominal maturity structure.
Additionally, in our model, the government can in°uence the price of outstanding nominal bonds
via current and future nominal interest rate policy. This opens up a second channel for hedging
¯scal shocks that is absent in the Siu and SU models.
5II. A model with sticky prices
The economy is inhabited by a population of in¯nitely-lived households, ¯rms and a government.
Let st 2 S ½ RN denote a period t shock and assume that S is a ¯nite set with elements fb s1;:::;b sNg.
Let st = fs0;:::stg 2 St+1 denote a t-period history of shocks. We assume that s0 is distributed
according to ¼0 and that subsequently shocks evolve according to a Markov process with transition
matrix ¼. ¼ is assumed to be monotone: if s > s0, then
P
s00¸e s ¼(s00js) ¸
P
s00¸e s ¼(s00js0) for each
e s 2 S. Finally, we denote the implied probability distribution over shock histories st by ¼t.
A. Households
Households have preferences over stochastic sequences of cash goods fc1tg1
t=0, credit goods fc2tg1
t=0
and labor fltg1








where U : R2
+£[0;T] ! R is twice continuously di®erentiable on the interior of its domain, strictly
concave, strictly increasing in its ¯rst two arguments and decreasing in its third argument. We
also assume that U is homothetic in (c1;c2) and weakly separable in l. We use the notation Ujt,
j = 1;2;l to denote the derivatives of U with respect to each of its arguments at date t. We let
Ujkt, j;k = 1;2;l denote its second derivatives at t.




+, where the superscript k denotes the maturity of the bond and
K is the maximal maturity traded. The period 0 shock, s0, is then realized and asset markets
open. In equilibrium, households trade bonds and money with the government. We let f M0(s0) and
f e Bk
0(s0)gK
k=1 denote the portfolio of bonds and money purchased by households.
In subsequent periods, asset market trading is assumed to occur in two stages. The ¯rst stage
takes place before the current period shock is realized, the second stage after this realization.
Households receive wages and dividend payments at the end of the period. These are paid in cash
6(or claims to cash).
First Round of Trading Households invest cash payments received in the previous period
in bonds in advance of the current period's shock, and the government sells a portfolio of bonds to
households prior to the shock, to better insure itself.
Second Round of Trading Next, the households can liquidate their bond holdings in light of
their state-contingent period t cash needs.67 Let Mt(st¡1) and fBk
t (st¡1)gK
k=1 denote the portfolio
of money and bonds purchased by households during the ¯rst trading round. Let f Mt(st) and
f e Bk
t (st)gK
k=1 denote the portfolio purchased in the second round.
Spot markets After asset trading is complete, households split into shoppers and workers.
The shopper takes the household's money to the goods market, where she purchases cash and
credit goods. The shopper must use money to buy cash goods. Consequently, she faces the cash-
in-advance constraints, 8t ¸ 0, st 2 St+1 :
Pt(st)c1t(st) · f Mt(st); (2)
where Pt(st) is the price of both cash and credit goods. Meanwhile, the worker exerts e®ort in
production lt(st). At the end of the period the household receives nominal income It(st), where





Here Wt(st) denotes the period t nominal wage, while ¦i
t(st) is the nominal pro¯ts of intermediate
goods ¯rm i at this date. The household then pays its taxes, settles any outstanding credit balances
and takes its portfolio into the subsequent period.
Entering into period t, the household has a quantity of money and claims to period t money
7given by:
e At¡1(st¡1) ´ e B1
t¡1(st¡1) + ff Mt¡1(st¡1) ¡ Pt¡1(st¡1)c1t¡1(st¡1)g
¡Pt¡1(st¡1)c2t¡1(st¡1) + (1 ¡ ¿t¡1(st¡1))It¡1(st¡1);
where ¿t¡1(st¡1) is the tax rate levied on household income. Thus, e At¡1(st¡1) includes nominal
bonds maturing at date t, money that was not spent on cash or credit goods, after-tax income,
less any debts accrued through the purchase of consumption goods on credit. Analogously, de¯ne
At(st¡1) = Mt(st¡1) + B1
t (st¡1) to be the quantity of one period bonds and cash purchased in the














t(st¡1), k 2 f2;:::;Kg, is the nominal price of the k-th maturity bond and e Q1
t(st¡1) = 1.8













t(st), k 2 f1;:::;Kg, is the nominal price of the k-th maturity bond in this round. We
normalize Q0
t to 1.
Finally, following Chari and Kehoe (1993), we assume that households participate anonymously
in the bond market. This assumption makes any bonds issued by households unenforceable and
ensures that no one is willing to buy such a bond.9 It clearly prevents households from running
Ponzi games. Formally, we assume, for all t, st and k,
Bk
t (st¡1) ¸ 0; e Bk
t (st) ¸ 0: (5)
8This precludes equilibrium lending by the government to households. Consequently, we will refer
to (5) as a no lending constraint. Ultimately, the repayment of a government loan and the payment
of a tax represent transfers to the government from households. Typically, Ramsey models assume
that one (the tax) is a linear function of a household's income or consumption, while the other (the
repayment) is lump sum. This treatment is somewhat arbitrary. In richer models with heterogeneity
and private household information, it may well be desirable, and, perhaps, necessary to allow
transfers between governments and households, regardless of whether they are labeled a tax or
a repayment, to depend on the households observed income or consumption. If loan repayments
depend on such observables, then they will typically be distortionary, just as taxes are. We do
not explicitly model such costs, rather we simply rule government loans out. As we discuss in
Section VI, absent restrictions on government lending, the government can attain an allocation
arbitrarily close to that in a complete markets economy by lending arbitrarily large amounts at
shorter maturities and borrowing arbitrarily large amounts at longer ones. Thus, this model forces
one to take a position on whether these extreme asset market positions are reasonable. Our no
lending constraints preclude them.10
Households maximize (1) subject to the constraints (2), (3), (4) and (5).
B. Final goods ¯rms
Final goods ¯rms produce output Yt for household and government consumption from intermediate









, ¹ > 1: (6)
Intermediate goods are produced by sticky and °exible price ¯rms. The former set their t period
price, Pst, before st is revealed, the latter set their price, Pf;t, after st is revealed. Letting ½ denote
the fraction of sticky price ¯rms and assuming symmetry across each type of intermediate good











Yf;t and Ys;t are, respectively, the amount of °exible and sticky price intermediate good used. Final
9goods ¯rms behave competitively. Taking prices as given, they choose quantities of intermediate













Intermediate goods are produced with labor according to the technology: Yit = L®
it: Substituting
this and the demand curves stemming from (7) into its objective, a °exible price intermediate goods
















































The government faces a stochastic process for government spending fGtg1
t=0 of the form Gt(st) =
G(st), where G : S ! R+ is exogenously given and strictly increasing. The government ¯nances
its spending by levying taxes on labor and trading non-contingent nominal bonds of maturity k ·
K. Like the households, from period t = 1 onwards, the government engages in two rounds of asset












10where e Ag;t¡1(st¡1) = f Mt¡1(st¡1)+ e B1
g;t¡1(st¡1)¡¿t¡1(st¡1)It¡1(st¡1)+Pt¡1(st¡1)G(st¡1), Ag;t(st¡1) =
Mt(st¡1)+B1
g;t(st¡1), the g subscript is used to denote the government's outstanding debt, and the
same notational conventions are used to denote portfolios before and after each round of trading.












E. Competitive equilibria and allocations
We de¯ne a competitive equilibrium as follows.
De¯nition 1. fc1t; c2t; lt, Lf;t; Ls;t; ¿t; Wt; Ps;t+1; Pf;t; Pt; fQk
tgK







k=1, Mt, f e Bk
t gK
k=1; f e Bk
g;tgK
k=1, f Mtg1









t=0 solves the household's problem given the household's
initial portfolio M0, fBk
0gK










t=0 solve the ¯nal goods ¯rm's problem
given the price sequence fPs;t; Pf;tg1
t=0;
3. the price sequences fPf;tg1
t=0 and fPs;t+1g1
t=0 solve the intermediate goods ¯rms' problems;
4. the government's budget constraints hold at each date;
5. the labor market clears: 8t, st, lt(st) = (1 ¡ ½)Lf;t(st) + ½Ls;t(st);
6. the bond markets clear: 8t, st, k, Bk
t (st¡1) = Bk
g;t(st¡1), e Bk
t (st) = e Bk
g;t(st).
7. the no lending constraints hold: 8t, st, and 8 k ¸ 1, Bk
g;t(st¡1) ¸ 0, e Bk
g;t(st) ¸ 0:
We will call a sequence e1 = fc1t; c2t; Lf;t; Ls;tg1
t=0 an allocation and a sequence e1(st¡1) =
fc1t+r(st¡1;¢); c2t+r(st¡1;¢); Lft+r(st¡1;¢); Lst+r(st¡1;¢)g1
r=0 a continuation allocation. We will say
that e1 is a competitive allocation if it is part of a competitive equilibrium.
11III. Characterizing competitive allocations
We take a primal approach to the government's problem. To this end we provide a set of conditions
that characterize competitive allocations. We begin by informally listing and discussing these
conditions; we then establish their necessity and su±ciency for a competitive allocation. First, we
list three more or less standard conditions.
A. Standard Constraints




These ensure that the nominal interest rate is always non-negative and that there is no opportunity
for arbitrage between money and nominal debt. Next, we have a set of resource constraints that
ensure total consumption equals total ¯nal goods output, for all t, st,











Third, we have a set of constraints that guarantee consistency of the allocation with pro¯t maxi-
mizing behavior on the part of the sticky price intermediate goods ¯rms:
X
stjst¡1
¼(stjst¡1)Ult(st)©(st) = 0; (11)




¹ ¡ Ls;t(st). These will be referred to as sticky price ¯rm opti-
mality conditions in what follows.
12B. Implementability Constraints
Our fourth set of constraints are the counterparts of the implementability constraint, found in most
analyses of dynamic optimal taxation, and the measurability constraints found in the non-contingent
debt model of Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and SeppÄ alÄ a (2002).11 To state them we introduce, and
give economic interpretations for, the following pieces of notation.


















gives the present discounted value of future primary surpluses accruing to the government after st.
To see this, note that the household's ¯rst order conditions and the expression for pro¯ts from an
intermediate goods ¯rms, gives ¤t = ¹tMt +¯Et[¸t+1] fPtc1t +Ptc2t ¡(1 ¡ ¿t)Itg. Also, we can
rewrite the income term as: It = (1¡½)[¦ft+WtLf;t] + ½[¦st+WtLs;t] = (1¡½)Pf;tYf;t + ½Ps;tYs;t
= PtYt. Combining the expression for ¤t and It, the resource constraint, and the household's ¯rst









¡1 is the nominal interest rate.
It then follows from the (12) that »t(st) does indeed give the present discounted value of future
primary surpluses.
Unanticipated In°ation Next, we derive an expression for the ratio of the sticky price level


























13In Proposition 2 below we show that in a competitive equilibrium,
Ps;t(st¡1)
Pt(st) = Nt(st). Absent
uncertainty, the prices of sticky and °exible price ¯rms are equal. Thus, Nt(st) can be interpreted
as an \unanticipated in°ation" term, that departs from one when shocks to the environment prompt
°exible price ¯rms to set their prices to values di®erent from those set by sticky price ¯rms.



















1 k = 1:













this case, the expectations hypothesis holds and the price of a bond equals the product of credit-
cash good wedges over the term of the bond. Notice that Dk
t+1 describes how the future allocation
in°uences the current price of the k-maturity bond.






























The portfolio weights at date 0 are taken to be predetermined and we will refer to the date 0
versions of (14) as the implementability constraints. At dates t > 0, the portfolio weights will be
chosen as part of the competitive equilibrium. However, since the fat;fbk
tgK
k=2g are measurable
14with respect to st¡1 they place cross-state restrictions on the process for »t. Following Aiyagari,
Marcet, Sargent and SeppÄ alÄ a (2002), we will refer to these conditions as measurability constraints.
They are crucial in what follows. The left hand side of (14) can again be interpreted as the value of
the government's primary surpluses (now priced in terms of period t cash good consumption). The
right hand side of this equation can be interpreted as the value of the government's liabilities. To





































t+1(st) in (15) gives the right hand side of (14). In
any competitive equilibrium, this liability value must equal the value of the government's primary
surpluses and (14) must hold.
Two Types of Hedging Although the portfolio weights fat; fbk+1
t gK¡1
k=1 g are predetermined at
t, the values of the di®erent liabilities in the government's portfolio are not. These can be altered in
two ways: (1) by unanticipated changes to the price level and (2) by changes to the nominal term
structure. As the formulas above indicate, unanticipated increases in the price level are associated
with reductions in Nt(st), while decreases in nominal bond prices are associated with falls in the
U2t(st)
U1t(st)Dk
t (st) values. Both changes cause the value of the government's liabilities on the right hand
side of (14) to fall. Such a reduction is desirable if the government is trying to attain a lower
primary surplus value
»t(st)
U1t(st) in the aftermath of a ¯scal shock.
On the other hand, the Nt(st) and
U2t(st)
U1t(st)Dk
t+1(st) also capture the costly distortions to the
pattern of production across ¯rms and consumption across goods introduced by unanticipated
price level and term structure changes. Speci¯cally, if events occur at t that induce ¯rms to alter
their prices and to which only °exible price ¯rms can react, an ine±cient allocation of production
across ¯rm types will occur. A wedge is driven between the marginal products of labor at sticky
and °exible price ¯rms. Reductions in the price of outstanding bonds with maturity greater than 1,




k=1 terms, are associated with nominal interest rates in excess of zero.12
These result in a misallocation of consumption across cash and credit goods as households seek
to economize on their use of cash. A wedge is driven between the marginal utilities of these two
goods.
C. Comparison with Existing Models
The key di®erence between our model and others becomes apparent in the measurability constraints.
It is worth contrasting our version of these conditions (14) with those in the more restrictive envi-
ronments of Siu (2004) and Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and SeppÄ alÄ a (2002), and the less restrictive
environment of Lucas and Stokey (1983).
In the model of Lucas and Stokey, the government can trade real state contingent debt, and so




The portfolio weight at is st-measurable, so that unlike (14) or (17), (16) does not represent a
collection of cross state restrictions. Except at date 0, when a0(s0) is ¯xed, the constraints in (16)
are redundant.







U1t(st) can be varied across states st only by creating unanticipated in°ation or changing
Nt(st). Since there is no long term debt, there is clearly no opportunity to devalue this debt
through increases in future nominal interest rates.





In this most limiting case, there is not even the opportunity to devalue debt through unexpected
16in°ation. To summarize the discussion in the preceding paragraphs, (14) incorporates the fact
that when the government can only trade nominal non-contingent debt implementing stochastic
variations in the value of the government's outstanding liabilities is costly. These costs constrain
the evolution of the primary surplus value process f»tg1
t=0.
D. No Lending Constraints
Our ¯nal set of constraints are the no lending constraints. These ensure that the household's bond
holdings are non-negative. For maturities k > 1, we have:
8t;st;k > 1, bk
t(st¡1) ¸ 0;
while for one period nominal liabilities:
at(st¡1) ¸ 0:
The following proposition formally establishes the necessity and su±ciency of the conditions for a
competitive allocation.
Proposition 2. e1 = fc1t;c2t;Lf;t;Ls;tg
1




























k = 1;¢¢¢ ;K ¡ 1, such that the portfolio weight sequence and e1 satisfy:




2. for all t, st,











173. for all t > 0, st¡1,
X
stjst¡1
¼(stjst¡1)Ult(st)©(st) = 0; (21)











5. for all t ¡ 1, st¡1, k > 1,
at(st¡1) ¸ 0; (23)
bk
t(st¡1) ¸ 0:
If e1 = fc1t;c2t;Lf;t;Ls;tg
1









with cjt > 0,











Ps0 , k = 1;¢¢¢ ;K ¡ 1.
Proof: See Appendix A. ¥
Remark The requirement that the competitive allocation be interior in the second part of
the above proposition is satis¯ed if the household's utility function satis¯es appropriate Inada
conditions and if the associated competitive equilibrium has tax rates ¿t strictly less than 1.
IV. The Ramsey problem




















¯tU(c1t;c2t;(1 ¡ ½)Lf;t + ½Ls;t)
#
(24)







Ps0, the no arbitrage (19) and resource (20)
constraints, the sticky price ¯rm optimality conditions (21), the measurability and implementability
(22), and no lending (23) constraints. We will call this the Ramsey problem with nominal debt and
no government lending.
The initial period of Problem 1 is somewhat di®erent from later periods in that the portfolio
weights fa0;fbk
0gK
k=2g are ¯xed, whereas in later periods they are chosen. Consequently, it is use-
ful to split the government's choice problem into two pieces. In the ¯rst piece, the government
picks a period 0 allocation and some state variables. In the second piece, the government selects
a continuation allocation fc1t;c2t;Lf;t;Ls;tg1




t=1 taking the state variables as given. These state variables ensure that the con-
tinuation allocation satis¯es all of the period 0 constraints. A solution to Problem 1 can then
be reconstructed from the solutions to these two sub-problems. More formally, notice that the





















Thus, if an allocation fc1t;c2t;Lf;t;Ls;tg1
t=0 satis¯es the implementability constraint, then there
exists a tuple fÁ1;fDk
1gK¡1
k=1 g such that fc10;c20;Lf0;Ls0;Á1;fDk
1gK¡1
k=1 g satis¯es (25), and the con-
tinuation allocations fc1t(s0;¢);c2t(s0;¢);Lf;t(s0;¢);Ls;t(s0;¢)g1
t=1 satisfy (26). The converse is also
true. fÁ1;fDk
0gK¡1
k=1 g act as state variables for the government's continuation problem. Á1 describes
how the continuation allocation a®ects the value of the government's stream of primary surpluses,
while the fDk
1gK¡1
k=1 variables describe how this allocation a®ects the value of the government's
period 0 liabilities. In Section VIII we develop a fully recursive formulation of the Ramsey problem
based on this observation. In Sections VI and VII we consider simpler problems in which bk
0 = 0,
k > 2. This simpli¯cation implies that the government's period 0 liability value (the left hand side
19of (25)) is independent of the fDk
1gK¡1
k=1 values. Thus, Á1 serves as the only state variable. The
government's continuation problem can then be written as:










¯tU(c1t;c2t;(1 ¡ ½)Lf;t + ½Ls;t)
#
(27)
subject to the constraints (19) to (23) from period one onwards and the implementability constraint
Á1 = Es0[»1(s1)]: (28)
We will call Á1 an expected primary surplus value. We now introduce a benchmark complete markets
economy in which the government implements the Friedman rule.
V. Complete markets problem
The economy considered above incorporated two sorts of asset market frictions. First, the govern-
ment could only trade nominally non-contingent debt; second, the government could not lend. The
complete markets environment described in this section removes both of these frictions. Households
and the government can now trade nominal state-contingent claims fFtg1
t=0.
We assume (wlog) that these claims are of one period maturity only and that there is only one
trading round. The household's budget constraint is now:







t+1 is the pricing kernel for this market structure. The government's budget constraint is
similarly altered. By an argument similar to that in Proposition 2, one can show that a sequence
fc1t;c2t;Lf;t;Ls;tg1
t=0 is a competitive allocation in this environment at (Ps0;F0), if it satis¯es
20(19)-(21) and
»0(s0) = U10(s0)N0(s0)f0(s0); (29)
where f0(s0) =
F0(s0)
Ps0 . The incorporation of state-contingent debt renders the measurability con-
straints redundant.14 In addition, the absence of the no lending constraints on the government
removes any non-negativity restrictions on the government's debt portfolio.
The Ramsey problem in this environment entails the government maximizing its objective
subject to (19)-(21) and (29). To avoid the special nature of the initial period, we again focus on
the government's continuation problem. In analogy with Continuation Problem 1 of the previous
section, this can be stated as:15








¯tU(c1t;c2t;(1 ¡ ½)Lf;t + ½Ls;t)
#
(30)
subject to, for t ¸ 1, no arbitrage (19), resource (20), sticky price ¯rm optimality (21), and the
implementability (28) constraints.
In Appendix B we show the following:
Proposition 3. Under our assumed preferences, the solution to Continuation Problem 2 is such
that:
1. The Friedman rule holds and U1t = U2t.
2. Flexible price ¯rms always set their prices to the same value as sticky price ¯rms and Nt = 1.
VI. The role of the no lending constraint
We use Continuation Problem 1 and Continuation Problem 2 above to explain the role of the no
lending constraints in the clearest way. To do this, we ¯rst rewrite the measurability constraints in a





and a vector of portfolio weights ¡t(st¡1) = (at(st¡1);¢¢¢ ;bK
t (st¡1)). We next de¯ne a matrix of


















Using this notation, the measurability constraints can be rewritten as, for all t, st¡1,
¥t(st¡1) 2 Span(ªt(st¡1)): (32)
In words, the time t primary surplus values need to lie in the space spanned by the cash and
bond return matrix. It follows from Proposition 3 that when markets are complete, the optimal
continuation allocation equates the marginal utilities of cash and credit goods and the prices of
the sticky and °exible-type ¯rms. In that case, ªt(st¡1) is reduced to the unit matrix. By (32),
implementation of this allocation in the non-contingent debt economy would require that
»t(st)
U1t(st)
be st¡1-measurable. If this requirement does not hold, and in general it will not,16 then the
optimal complete markets allocation cannot be implemented with non-contingent nominal debt.
The logic is straightforward; this allocation precludes state-contingent variations in interest rates
or in in°ation, yet it is in precisely these ways that the government introduces state contingency
into its liability values in the non-contingent nominal debt economy. However, if we drop the no
lending constraints from the non-contingent debt economy, then arbitrarily small deviations from
the optimal complete markets allocation can then be used to ensure that ¥t(st¡1) 2 Span(ªt(st¡1))
and that the measurability constraints are satis¯ed. Such small deviations will perturb the ªt(st¡1)
only slightly from the unit matrix. Consequently, the government will need to take extreme positions
in asset markets to induce the required variation in primary surplus values. One further implication
is that absent additional restrictions on debt trades, there exists no solution to the government's
problem since, when K ¸ 2, the optimal complete markets allocation does not lie in the set of
22allocations implementable in the non-contingent debt economy, but does lie in its closure. In an
example in Appendix C, we make this explicit.
We now reinstate the no lending constraints. In this case, ¥t(st¡1) 2 Span+(ªt(st¡1)), where
Span+(ªt(st¡1)) = fy 2 RN : y = ªt(st¡1)x;x 2 RK
+g. It follows that the government can no
longer take extreme asset positions. Consequently, it will not in general be able to implement the
optimal allocation from the complete markets problem.
Before proceeding, we brie°y compare these observations to the results of Buera and Nicolini
(2004) and Angeletos (2002). These authors obtain related measurability constraints in economies
with non-contingent real debt of various maturities and no restrictions on lending. Let ªreal
t (st¡1)
denote the pricing matrix for non-contingent real debt after history st¡1. Angeletos shows that
when K ¸ N, the set of allocations for which Span(ªreal
t (st¡1)) = RN, all t, st¡1, is dense in
the set of complete markets allocations. Hence, for this case, the closure of the set of allocations
implementable in the non-contingent debt economy equals the set implementable in the complete
markets economy. Generically, the optimal complete markets allocation can be implemented with
non-contingent real debt when K ¸ N. However, Buera and Nicolini show in a series of calibrated
numerical examples that the government may need to take large debt positions to achieve this
implementation. Buera and Nicolini regard this as a problem. In contrast, with non-contingent
nominal debt, the optimal complete markets allocation can never be implemented, and the imple-
mentation of allocations close to it always require extreme debt positions. In this sense the problem
identi¯ed by Buera and Nicolini is more severe in an economy with nominal debt.
VII. An illustrative example
To obtain insight into optimal nominal debt management, we begin by considering a simpli¯ed
version of Continuation Problem 1. In this version, we show that it is weakly optimal for the gov-
ernment to use only the longest term nominal debt. Speci¯cally, in the ¯rst round of asset trading
in each period, the government buys the outstanding portfolio of money and bonds and sells only
the longest term debt. The households hold this portfolio when the shock occurs. In the case of
23separable utility, we show that the government uses this greater °exibility to postpone the distor-
tionary positive nominal interest rates needed to undertake a state-contingent debt devaluation. In
doing so, our government clearly does not minimize the cost of debt service. The long term debt
that it sells is relatively risky for households and they must be compensated accordingly. The risk
premium earned by households who hold long run debt is, from the government's point of view, an
insurance premium.
Setup We assume the following process for shocks. In period 1, a state s is drawn from the
set S = fs;sg according to probability distribution ¼. If s = s then the government faces a low
period 1 spending shock, G1(s) = G, followed by a constant sequence of moderate spending levels
in subsequent periods, Gt(s) 2 (G;G), t = 2;¢¢¢. If s = s, then the government faces a high
period 1 spending shock, G(s) = G followed by the same sequence of moderate spending levels. All
uncertainty is resolved in period 1. Consequently, the date t > 1 sticky price, measurability and no
lending constraints will not bind and can be dropped.












¯t¡1U(c1t(s);c2t(s);(1 ¡ ½)Lf;t(s) + ½Ls;t(s))
#
¼(s) (33)
subject to the no arbitrage conditions,
8t;s 2 S; U1t(s) ¡ U2t(s) ¸ 0; (34)
the resource constraints,











24the optimality condition for sticky price ¯rms in period 1,
X
s2S
¼(s)Ul1(s)©1(s) = 0; (36)
























5U11(s)N1(s) = »1(s); (38)
and the ¯rst period no lending conditions,
a1 ¸ 0; for k = 2;¢¢¢ ;K; bk
1 ¸ 0: (39)
Notice that since this is a continuation problem, the government inherits an expected primary
surplus value, Á1, from period 0. We assume Á1 > 0. The constraint (37) captures the fact that
the government must implement this value.
Let ³0 denote the Lagrange multiplier on the implementability constraint (37) and ³1(s)¼(s)
the multiplier on the s-th measurability constraint (38). We assume that ³0 < 0. Also de¯ne &1 to
be the multiplier on the sticky price constraint, set &t = 0, t > 1 and for i = 1;2, let
Hit(s) = [³0 + ³1(s)¼(s)]¯tfU1it(s)c1t(s) + Uit(s) + U2it(s)c2t(s) + Ulit¨t(s)g + &tUlit(s)©t(s)¼(s):
25The ¯rst order condition for cit, t = 2;¢¢¢ ;K ¡ 1 can then be expressed as:

























where ¯t´t(s)¼(s) and ¯tÂt(s)¼(s) are, respectively, the multipliers on the (s;t)-th no arbitrage
and resource constraints. For t = 1, the corresponding ¯rst order condition is:






















Additionally, the ¯rst order conditions for a1 and bk+1













¼(s) + µk+1; (41)
where µ1 and µk+1 are the Lagrange multipliers on the no lending constraints. We now use these
¯rst order conditions to establish (1) that there is a solution to the government's problem in which
the government uses only the longest term debt, and, in the case of separable utility, that (2) the
spending shock's e®ect on nominal interest rates persists until the longest term debt matures, and
(3) after a high government spending shock, the short run nominal interest rate rises over the term
of the initially outstanding debt. The expected holding return increases in the maturity as well.
Lemma 4. There exists a solution to the government's problem in which a1 = 0, bk+1
1 = 0,
k = 1;¢¢¢ ;K ¡ 2 and bK
1 > 0.
The proof of Lemma 4 (in the appendix) has the following implication.
26Corollary 5. If ³1(s) < 0 for some s, then 1) it is strictly optimal to use only the longest term
debt, 2) after shock G1(s), the nominal interest rate is greater than zero in periods t = 2;¢¢¢ ;K¡1.
The corollary immediately implies that if the measurability constraint binds and ³1(s) < 0, then
the Friedman rule is not optimal. Moreover, the spending shock has persistent e®ect on nominal
interest rates that is tied to the term of the outstanding debt in period 1.
Separable utility To obtain sharper results we further specialize preferences. Suppose that the
household's preferences are given by (1¡°)logc1t+° logc2t+v(lt). This renders the government's
primary surplus values independent of the consumption allocation and allows us to focus on the
e®ect of this allocation upon the government's liability values. We ¯rst show that in this case,
³1(s) > 0 > ³1(s0), for s;s0 2 S. It then follows from the proof of the previous lemma that only
long term debt is used.
Lemma 6. Assume the preferences (1 ¡ °)logc1 + ° logc2 + v(l). Then, ³1(s) > 0 > ³1(s0).
We now show that when ³1(s) < 0, nominal interest rates rise over the term of the outstanding
debt. Intuitively, the government exploits the °exibility a®orded by long term debt to postpone
costly nominal interest rate rises.
Lemma 7. Assume the preferences (1¡°)logc1+° logc2+v(l). In the state s such that ³1(s) < 0,
Q1
t+1(s) < Q1
t(s), k = 1;¢¢¢ ;K ¡ 1. For t > K ¡ 1, Q1
t(s) = 1. In the state s such that ³1(s) > 0,
Q1
t(s) = 1 for all t.
Lemma 7 has immediate implications for the yield curve. If the measurability constraint does
not bind and ³1(s) > 0, then the yield curve remains at zero. On the other hand, if this constraint
binds and ³1(s) < 0, then the yield curve rises and tilts upwards. Additionally, Lemma 7 implies




1 ] across states is increasing in its
maturity k. Consequently, the holding return on this debt expected in period 0 is also increasing in
the maturity k. The government sells debt that, under the optimal interest rate policy, is relatively
expensive in order to hedge itself against shocks.17 The next section derives a recursive formulation
of the Ramsey problem that enables us to solve it in less stylized settings.
27VIII. A general recursive formulation
We now look for a recursive formulation that will allow us to solve problems with in¯nite horizons
and richer shock processes. We then put this formulation to work and compute solutions to Ramsey
problems with nominal debt of various maturities. Recall that associated with any competitive
allocation e1 are sequences f»tg1
t=0 and fDk
t+1g1





. Our approach treats tuples of the form fÁt+1;fDk
t+1gK¡1
k=1 ;stg as state variables
that summarize relevant aspects of the past history of an allocation. Speci¯cally, we may view Át+1
and each Dk
t+1 as representing implicit promises that the government has made at t concerning the
value of its overall liability portfolio and the value of speci¯c bonds within that portfolio. Future
allocation choices must implement these promises.
We begin by de¯ning a state space for our recursive formulation. This consists of the set of
tuples fÁ;fDkgK¡1
k=1 ;sg consistent with a continuation competitive allocation. More formally, let
E(Á;fDkgK¡1



















k = 2;¢¢¢ ;K ¡ 1
1 k = 1:
(43)
We then de¯ne the state space as X ´ f(Á;fDkgK¡1
k=1 ;s) : E(Á;fDkgK¡1
k=1 ;s) 6= ?g. For subsequent
numerical analysis, it is useful to have bounds for the set X. The absence of government lending
implies that Á ¸ 0. We assume that the variables ¤t are uniformly bounded above. This is the
case if, for example, U(c1;c2;l) = (1 ¡ °)logc1 + ° logc2 + v(l), with v decreasing. Such a bound,
coupled with (42), implies an upper bound on the Á variables which we denote Ámax. Next, note
(43) coupled with the no arbitrage constraint, implies that each Dk 2 [0;1]. Also, for k = 1, Dk is
normalized to 1. It follows that X ½ Z ´ [0;Ámax] £ f1g£ [0;1]
K¡2 £ S.
De¯ne the correspondence ¡ pointwise as follows.
28De¯nition 8. Let ¡(Á;fDkgK¡1
k=1 ;s) equal all tuples fa;fbkgK
k=2;c1; c2; Lf; Ls, Á0; fDk0gK¡1
k=1 g such
that ci ¸ 0, i = 1;2, Li 2 [0;1], i = f;s, and
1. for all s0,
U1(s0) ¸ U2(s0); (44)
2. for all s0,



























N(s0) = ¤(s0) + ¯Á0(s0); (48)








7. for each s0
(Á0(s0);fDk0(s0)gK¡1
k=1 ;s0) 2 X. (50)
We say that fc1t(s;¢); c2t(s;¢); Lf;t(s;¢); Ls;t(s;¢)g1
t=1 is generated by ¡ from (Á;fDkgK¡1
k=1 ;s)














Our ¯nal de¯nition gives a counterpart of ¡ for the initial period of the government's problem.
De¯nition 9. Let fa0;fbk+1
0 gK¡1
k=1 g 2 RK
+. De¯ne ¡0(a0;fbk+1
0 gK¡1
k=1 ) to be all those tuples fc10;
c20; Lf0; Ls0; Á1; fDk
1gK¡1
k=1 g that satisfy ci0 ¸ 0, Li0 2 [0;T], (44), (45), (50) and









N0(s0) = ¤0(s0) + ¯Á1(s0): (52)
Lemma 10 establishes the recursivity of competitive allocations.
Lemma 10. A sequence e1 = fc1t;c2t;Lf;t;Ls;tg1
t=0 is a competitive allocation at fPs0;M0;fBk
0gK
k=1g
if there exists a tuple fÁ1;fDk
1gK¡1
k=1 g such that
1. fc10;c20;Lf0;Ls0;Á1;fDk
1gK¡1








2. each continuation allocation e1(s) is generated by ¡ from fÁ1(s); fDk
1(s)gK¡1
k=1 ;sg.
If e1 = fc1t;c2t;Lf;t;Ls;tg
1









with cjt > 0,
j = 1;2 and (1 ¡ v)Lf;t + vLs;t 2 (0;T), then there exists tuple fÁ1;fDk
1gK¡1
k=1 g such that e1 and
fÁ1;fDk
1gK¡1
k=1 g satisfy conditions (1) and (2) above.
Proof: Suppose e1 satis¯es the conditions in the lemma. The de¯nitions of ¡0 and ¡
imply that e1 satis¯es the no arbitrage conditions (19), resource conditions (20), sticky price
conditions (21) and no government lending conditions (23) at each date. Since for each s 2 S,
e1(s); is generated by ¡ from fÁ1(s); fDk
1(s)gK¡1







t=1 such that these sequences and e1(s) satisfy (47),




¯j[¤t+1+j] + ¯REst [Át+R+1]:



















k = 2;¢¢¢ ;K ¡ 1
1 k = 1:
(54)




and (54) implies that e1 satis¯es the implementability and the measurability constraints (22). The
result then follows from Proposition 2.
For the converse, suppose that e1 is a competitive allocation. Then, it satis¯es the no arbitrage,




t=0 can be obtained using the earlier de¯nitions of Át+1 and Dk
t+1 variables.
It is straightforward to verify that after each t ¸ 1, st¡1, fc1t(st¡1;¢); c2t(st¡1;¢); Lf;t(st¡1;¢);
Lf;t(st¡1;¢); Át+1(st¡1;¢); fDk
t+1(st¡1;¢)gK¡1
k=1 g 2 ¡(Át(st¡1); fDk
t (st¡1)gK¡1
k=1 ; st¡1) and that at t =
0, fc10; c20; Lf0; Lf0; Á1; fDk
1gK¡1
k=1 g 2 ¡0(a0; fbk+1
0 gK¡1
k=1 ). ¥
In light of Lemma 10, we can divide the government's recursive Ramsey problem into an initial
period problem and a family of continuation problems. In the initial period problem the government
inherits a sticky price and a liability portfolio fPs0;M0;fBk
0gK
k=1g. It then chooses a period 0
allocation and a tuple of continuation state variables fÁ0;fDk0gK¡1
































The government arrives in subsequent periods with a vector of state variables fÁ;fDkgK
k=1g. It




k=1 ;s) = sup
¡(Á;fDkgK¡1
k=1 ;s)
Es[U(c1;c2;(1 ¡ ½)Lf + ½Ls) + ¯V (Á0;fDk0gK¡1
k=1 ;s0)]: (56)
The dynamic programming problems in (55) and (56) can be solved numerically.
IX. A Calibrated Example
We use the above recursive formulation to solve for the Ramsey equilibrium in a fully calibrated
version of our economy.
A. Numerical method and parameter values
Numerical method Our approach is to solve the dynamic programming problems (55) and (56)
and then back out the implied optimal policies. The state space X for these problems is endogenous
and of dimension K + 1. In our calculations we restrict the state space to be a K + 1-dimensional
rectangular subset ~ X of the bounding set Z. We check that we can numerically solve the dynamic
programming problems at each point in ~ X and that enlarging ~ X so that it remains in Z does not
signi¯cantly alter the numerical results we report. The dynamic programming problem is then
solved by a value iteration. We approximate the value functions with cubic splines.
Calibration To permit comparability of our results to those in Siu (2004) and Chari, Christiano
and Kehoe (1991), we ¯rst compute a baseline case with parameter values that are close to theirs.











+ Ã log(T ¡ l): (57)
We set the preference parameters °, Á and ¯ to 0:58, 0:79 and 0:96. We choose Ã so that approx-
imately 30% of an agent's time is spent working. The values of ° and Á are similar to those used
by Siu (2004) and Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991). These authors take logs in the expression
U1t=U2t = 1=Q1
t, identify cash good consumption with total money balances and then run a regres-
sion to obtain estimates of ° and Á. The value of Á used implies an elasticity of substitution between
cash and credit goods of approximately 4:8 and thus a high degree of substitutability between these
goods. We also compute a version of the model with preferences that are log in both cash and
credit goods. This version thus has a lower unit elasticity of substitution. We follow Siu (2004) and
set the production parameters ®, ¹ and ½ to 1:0, 1:05 and 0:08 respectively. Government spending
takes on two values G and G. The government spending process has a mean of around 20% of GDP
in a complete markets model with a debt to GDP ratio of 60%. We set the standard deviation
of this process to be 6.7%. The government spending shocks follow a symmetric Markov process
and it has an autocorrelation coe±cient of 0:95. These values for shocks and the shock process are
close to those estimated from the data and conform with the values used in Siu. We also consider
a version of the model with a larger standard deviation for shocks of 14%.
We allow the maximal maturity limit K to vary between 1 and 4. The number of state variables
in our dynamic programming problems equals K + 1. As a practical computational matter, we
keep the maximal maturity relatively short. Nonetheless, as we shall see moving from a maximal
maturity of one to a maximal maturity of four periods has an impact on the amount of hedging
that the government can do.
B. Results
All numerical calculations con¯rm our earlier analytical results that the government uses only the
longest maturity debt available. At the ¯rst round of trading in each period it buys up all of
33its outstanding nominal liabilities and sells long term debt. In the remainder of this section, we
focus on the implications of optimal policy for nominal interest rates, in°ation and debt holding
returns. We illustrate these implications with short run impulse responses to shocks and with
sample moments from long simulations.
B.1. Impulse responses
In each of the impulse responses presented in this section, the government is assumed to have an
initial debt value to output ratio of about 40%. The government then draws low spending shocks
until period 4, high spending shocks from periods 5 to 14 and low spending shocks thereafter. In
the ¯gures below the ¯rst and last periods in which spending shocks are high are marked with
vertical lines.
Holding returns Figure 1 shows the evolution of the real holding return on the government's
portfolio for economies with baseline preferences. The solid line is drawn for the case K = 4, the
dashed line for K = 3. In both cases, the holding return falls in period 5 contemporaneously with
the high spending shock. However, the reduction is signi¯cantly greater in the K = 4 case. Over
the next few periods, the holding returns rise. In period 15, government spending falls back to
the lower level and both holding returns rise sharply. This increase is about twice as large in the
K = 4 case. The quantitative di®erence between the two cases indicates that the government is
better able to hedge ¯scal shocks by devaluing its debt when the maturity of that debt is larger.
Nominal capital gains and in°ation Since the government uses only the longest term
debt, the real holding return on its portfolio at t can be decomposed as: HRt = qK




t¡1 gives the rate of nominal capital gains on the K-th maturity bond and
¼t is the in°ation rate. Figure 2 below illustrates the impulse responses of qK
t and ¼t for the cases
K = 3 and K = 4. Qualitatively, they are similar. In both cases, the K-maturity nominal bond
price decreases coincidentally with the onset of high government spending shocks in period 5. In
this way, the government reduces the real holding return on its portfolio by delivering a nominal
34Figure 1. Debt holding returns


































capital loss to bond holders. This bond price subsequently rises as the debt outstanding at the time
of the initial high spending shock matures. Conversely, when government spending falls back in
period 15, there is an increase in the nominal bond price and a nominal capital gain for investors.
These nominal capital gains and losses are reinforced by contemporaneous changes in in°ation.
This rises sharply at the beginning of the high government spending spell, and decreases sharply
at the end of this spell.
Despite these qualitative similarities, the response of bond prices and in°ation di®ers quantita-
tively across the two cases. The reduction in the debt price coincident with the high government
spending shock in period 5 is more than twice as great whenK = 4 relative to K = 3 and, since
the initially outstanding debt takes longer to mature in the K = 4 case, debt prices remain at lower
levels for longer. In contrast, the contemporaneous rise in in°ation in period 5 is slightly greater
when the maximal debt maturity is shorter and K = 3. (Although, in°ation remains higher for
longer in the K = 4 case). This indicates that the government relies more heavily on nominal
capital gains and losses and movements in the yield curve to hedge ¯scal shocks as the maximal
debt maturity increases.
35Figure 2. Nominal capital gains and in°ation



































Short run nominal interest rates As noted previously, absent uncertainty, the formula for
the equilibrium price of the K period nominal bond at t is simply the product of the reciprocal of
gross one period nominal bond returns between t and t + K ¡ 1. When uncertainty is introduced,
the relationship between current bond prices and future short term nominal interest rates is more
complicated. Inspection of the formula for the k-th period debt price given Section III B, reveals
that:
Qk









where the expectation ~ Et is constructed using the adjusted probability distribution






This adjusted probability distribution weights states in which the realized value of Nt+j and the
cash good marginal utility U1t+j are high more heavily than does the true probability distribution
¼t(¢jst). Since the reciprocal of the gross one period nominal interest rate equals U2t=U1t, it follows
36from these equations that a low debt price Qk
t is associated with a high conditional expectation
of future short term nominal interest rates (with respect to the adjusted probability distribution)
over the horizon t to t + k ¡ 1.
Figure 3. One period nominal interest rates
















































Figure 3 shows the impulse response of one period nominal interest rates for theK = 4 and
K = 3 cases. In each case, this interest rate gradually rises to a peak after period 5 and the
advent of the high government spending shocks. It then falls back (at date 5 + K ¡ 2) as the
debt outstanding at the time of the ¯rst high spending shock matures. The gradual increase is
consistent with e®orts to delay the distortion from positive nominal interest rates identi¯ed in the
example from Section VII. Quantitatively, the initial rise in nominal interest rates is larger and
more protracted when K = 4, relative to K = 3. In the former case, rates peak in period 7 at
about 0:45%, in the latter case at 0:30% in period 6. We conjecture that as K is increased further,
short term nominal interest rates would peak at a higher value and at a progressively later date.
We take these results as further indication that the government is better able to hedge using longer
term nominal debt, by delaying the associated costly nominal interest rate distortions.
37Sensitivity analysis: Variations in preferences and shock volatility Figure 4 shows the
evolution of one period holding returns on the government's portfolio and nominal interest rates
for the baseline economy (Case 1, solid line), an economy with a large shock volatility (a standard
deviation of 14%, dashed line) and an economy with a large shock volatility and preferences that
are log-log in cash and credit goods (Case 3, solid line with dots). After the high government
spending shock occurs, the holding return falls by 0:8% in Case 1, 1:8% in Case 2 and 4% in Case
3. Similarly, the peak in nominal short term nominal interest rates climbs from 0:45% in Case 1,
to 0:8% in Case 2, to 2:3% in Case 3. As the volatility of shocks rises, the government hedges to
a greater degree, in part by raising nominal interest rates further and distorting the cash-credit
good consumption more. When preferences are log-log in cash and credit goods, the elasticity
of substitution between these goods is reduced relative to the baseline case. Distortions to the
cash-credit good consumption margin are less costly and the government is prepared to distort this
margin even further. Thus, the holding return falls most in Case 3, and nominal interest rates rise
most in this case, after a high spending shock.
B.2. Long simulations
In this section we report results from long simulations of various economies. Each simulation is of
length Tsample = 20;000. Figure 5 shows simulated values for the debt to output ratio and nominal
interest rates for the ¯rst 1,000 periods of the baseline economy. The ¯gure shows that the volatility
of nominal interest rates is increasing in the debt level. This is largely because a given interest rate
volatility induces a greater variation in the government's total liability value at high debt levels.
Hence, it is more e®ective hedging against shocks.
Tables 1 and 2 below summarize the remainder of our results. Table 1 gives a rough measure of
the impact of a positive ¯scal shock on the value of the government's debt. In particular, the ¯rst
row of this table gives the average variation in the real value of government debt across high and
38Figure 4. Debt holding returns and nominal interest rates













































































The next two rows break this adjustment down into a component that comes purely from nominal
capital losses and a component that comes from a contemporaneous price in°ation. The remainder
of the table gives these values normalized in the variation in government spending ¢G = G ¡ G.
Table 1 reports results for the baseline economy with K = 1, 3 and 4. As K rises both the degree of
hedging (as measured by ¢B) and the extent to which this hedging is obtained from movements in
debt prices rather than contemporaneous in°ations increases. When K = 4, ¢B equals about 30%
39Figure 5. Debt levels and nominal interest rates

























































































¢ G. Over 60% of this variation comes from a movement
in the nominal debt price and less than 40% from a contemporaneous in°ation. The table also
reports results for the economy with more volatile shocks and with log-log preferences. There is
more hedging of shocks in both cases, with considerably increased reliance on adjustments in debt
price in the latter case.
Table 1: Financing Government Spending
K = 1 K = 3 K = 4
Base Base Base High volatility High vol.; log preferences
4 in real value of debt -0.0065 -0.0125 -0.0157 -0.0347 -0.0766
change in in°ation -0.0065 -0.0066 -0.0057 -0.0137 -0.0136
change in price of debt 0.0000 -0.0058 -0.010 -0.0212 -0.0634
4 in real value of debt (norm.) -0.1293 -0.2491 -0.3139 -0.3472 -0.7665
change in in°ation -0.1293 -0.1328 -0.1147 -0.1370 -0.1357
change in price of debt 0.0000 -0.1189 -0.2000 -0.2120 -0.6341
Table 2 reports statistics from long simulations of di®erent versions of the model. For reasons
of space, we focus below on the contrast between the baseline economies with K equal to one and
40K equal to four. First, the correlation between government spending shocks and the one period
nominal interest rates is increasing in the maximal debt maturity K. Relatedly, the correlation
between government spending shocks and the nominal price of the government's debt portfolio is
decreasing (towards ¡1) in K. This captures the fact that the government raises nominal interest
rates further from 0 for longer in the aftermath of an adjustment from low to high spending as
K rises. The correlation between interest rates and spending shocks is negative for K = 1, but
positive for K > 1. This stems from the fact that when K = 1, the measurability constraints are
of the form: »t = NtU1tat¡1. When a high spending shock occurs, »t falls. The government partly
accommodates this by decreasing U1t (relative to U2t) and, hence, reducing the current nominal
interest rate. For K > 1, the measurability constraint at the optimal debt portfolio takes the form:
»t = NtU2tDt+1bK
t¡1. In this case, to accommodate the fall in »t, the government depresses U2t
(relative to U1t) and Dt. Hence, it raises current and future nominal interest rates. Consistently,
the mean, standard deviation and autocorrelation coe±cient for nominal interest rates increases
with K. Conversely, the standard deviation of tax rates and their correlation with government
spending shocks decreases slightly as K increases from 1 to 4, indicating greater tax smoothing at
higher K values.
41Table 2: Statistics from Long Simulations
Statistics K = 1 K = 3 K = 4
Base Base Base High volatility High vol.; log preferences
in°ation
mean -4.016 -3.998 -3.947 -3.790 -3.288
st. deviation 0.227 0.290 0.268 0.634 0.997
autocorrelation 0.315 0.430 0.595 0.584 0.762
correlation with G-shock 0.167 0.369 0.462 0.478 0.654
taxes
mean 23.68 23.66 23.60 23.50 23.80
st.deviation 1.934 1.922 1.888 2.380 2.120
autocorrelation 0.995 0.995 0.996 0.985 0.982
correlation with G-Shock 0.229 0.217 0.217 0.372 0.268
price of debt
mean 0.999 0.998 0.996 0.991 0.977
st. deviation 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.013 0.027
autocorrelation 0.082 0.600 0.433 0.656 0.727
correlation with G-shock 0.398 -0.192 -0.293 -0.527 -0.744
1-period nom. interest rate
mean 0.067 0.084 0.135 0.292 0.800
st. deviation 0.168 0.181 0.223 0.495 1.160
autocorrelation 0.081 0.152 0.548 0.565 0.648
correlation with G-shock -0.396 0.420 0.499 0.504 0.667
42X. Conclusion
We have explored optimal debt management and taxation when the government is restricted to
using non-contingent nominal debt of various maturities and is limited in its ability to lend. Our
results imply that long term nominal debt can allow the government to hedge ¯scal shocks through
less distortionary nominal interest rate policies. Consequently, our model prescribes the use of long
term nominal debt. Others have argued against the use of such debt on the grounds that it is
excessively risky. In our model, the holding return on long term nominal debt is more volatile than
that on short term debt, but this volatility is deliberate and the government uses it to hedge ¯scal
shocks.
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Appendices
A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Part 1: Necessity Suppose fc1t;c2t;Lf;t;Ls;tg
1











. We show that it satis¯es the conditions in the proposition.
There is no loss of generality in replacing the no lending constraints on the household with an alternative
sequence of constraints 8t;st;k, Bk
t (st¡1) ¸ ¡B, e Bk
t (st) ¸ ¡B, B > 0 and in assuming that at the
equilibrium bond prices, households have no desire to borrow. Thus, these relaxed no lending constraints are
non-binding for the household. The interiority of the competitive allocation implies that the constraints cjt ¸
0, j = 1;2 and Lt 2 [0;T] are non-binding. For expositional purposes, we will assume the existence of optimal
Lagrange multipliers on the households' budget and cash-in-advance constraints and state the household's
45¯rst order conditions using these.18 Speci¯cally, let ¹t(st) denote the multiplier on the household's period
t cash-in-advance constraint. It represents the shadow price of liquidity. Let e ¸t+1(st) denote the multiplier
on the household's ¯rst round budget constraint (3) at t+1 after history st. Similarly, let ¸t+1(st+1) denote
the multiplier on the second round budget constraint (4) after history st+1. e ¸t+1 and ¸t+1 are the shadow
prices of nominal wealth at each trading round. Applying arguments of Kamihigashi (2003), we obtain the












t (st) + f Mt(st)
)#
= 0:
Using the optimal multipliers, the ¯rst order conditions for consumption and labor supply may be stared
as: are then:
c1t : f¯e ¸t+1(st) + ¹t(st)gPt(st) = U1t(st) (A1)
c2t : ¯e ¸t+1(st)Pt(st) = U2t(st) (A2)
lt : ¯e ¸t+1(st)(1 ¡ ¿t(st))
@It
@lt
(st) = ¡Ult(st): (A3)
The ¯rst order conditions for each of the asset levels are:
f Mt : ¸t(st) = ¹t(st) + ¯e ¸t+1(st) (A4)
Mt+1 : e ¸t+1(st) = Est[¸t+1] (A5)
e Bk
t : Qk
t(st)¸t(st) = ¯ e Qk
t+1(st)e ¸t+1(st) (A6)
Bk
t+1 : e Qk
t+1(st)e ¸t+1(st) = Est[Q
k¡1
t+1 ¸t+1] (A7)




¸ 1: This establishes (19). Adding the household's
and the government's ¯rst round budget constraints and the pro¯t conditions of ¯rms in any period gives
(20), the aggregate resource constraint.





















The °exible price intermediate goods ¯rm's ¯rst order conditions gives Pf;t(st) =
¹
®Wt(st)Lf;t(st)1¡®. Com-

























¹¡1Yt(st) = 0: (A10)
From the household's ¯rst order condition for labor, we have (1 ¡ ¿t)U2t
Pt = ¯e ¸t+1(1 ¡ ¿t) = ¡Ult
Wt: Applying














Substituting for Ys;t, Yf;t and canceling the Ps;t term gives (21).
Next take the household's ¯rst round budget constraint (3) at t + 1, multiply it by e ¸t+1(st) and add





t+1(st)e ¸t+1(st) e Bk
t (st) + f¯e ¸t+1(st) + ¹t(st)gf Mt(st)















t (st) + f¯e ¸t+1(st) + ¹t(st)gf Mt(st)










t+1 (st+1) + f Mt+1(st+1)
)#








t+1(st+1) + f¯e ¸t+2(st+1) + ¹t+1(st+1)gf Mt+1(st+1)
#
: (A11)
Using the expressions for pro¯ts from the intermediate goods ¯rms problems, It(st)=Wt(st) = ¨t(st). It-
























































De¯ne at(st¡1) and bk




































































Combining (A13), (A14), (A16) and the de¯nitions of at and bk





















Finally, the de¯nitions of bk
t and at and the fact that Bk
t ¸ 0 and At ¸ 0 gives the no lending constraints
(23).
Part 2: Sufficiency We construct a candidate competitive equilibrium from an allocation and a
portfolio weight sequence satisfying the conditions in the proposition. First we set prices. Speci¯cally, for


































: These conditions and the
equations (A17) and (A18) allow us to recursively recover all goods prices. For k > 0 and t ¸ 0, set the
asset prices Qk







Also, for k > 0 and t ¸ 0; set the asset prices from the period t + 1 ¯rst round budget constraint to be
e Qk
t+1(st) = Dk
t (st). For t > 0, we set the portfolios purchased by households in the ¯rst round of asset trading
as follows. The level of debt of k > 1 maturity is ¯xed at Bk
t (st¡1) = bk
t(st¡1)Ps;t(st¡1). Mt(st¡1) ¸ 0 and
B1
t(st¡1) ¸ 0 are chosen so that Mt(st¡1) + B1
t(st¡1) = at(st¡1)Ps;t(st¡1). Next we turn to the portfolios
purchased in the second round of trading. For t ¸ 0, the money supply is set to f Mt(st) = Pt(st)c1t(st), We
then choose each f e Bk
t (st)gK
k=1 2 RK













Given (23), these asset holdings are all non-negative. Moreover, by construction, they ensure that the second
round budget and cash-in-advance constraints are satis¯ed. The government's debt holdings are set equal
to the household's holdings of bonds.













The Lagrange multipliers can be recovered from ¸tPt = U1t ¸ 0, ¯e ¸t+1Pt = U2t and ¹tPt = U1t ¡ U2t ¸ 0:
To check that we have de¯ned a competitive allocation, we need to ensure that the ¯rst order conditions
of the households and ¯rms and their constraints are satis¯ed at the prices and tax rates constructed
above. It is immediate from the de¯nitions of multipliers that ¸t = ¹t + ¯e ¸t+1, f¯e ¸t+1 + ¹tgPt = U1t and
¯e ¸t+1Pt = U2t. The de¯nition of taxes and these multiplier de¯nitions gives ¯e ¸t+1(1 ¡ ¿t)@It=@lt = ¡Ult.





: From our de¯nitions of the multipliers, we then have
49e ¸t+1 = ¯Est[¸t+1]: Finally, the de¯nitions of Qk
t, e Qk
t+1 and the multipliers gives Qk
t¸t = ¯ e Qk
t+1e ¸t+1 and
e Qk
t+1e ¸t+1 = Est[Q
k¡1
t+1 ¸t+1]. Hence, all of the household's ¯rst order conditions are satis¯ed.
We now check that the household's ¯rst round budget constraints are satis¯ed. Combining (22), (A18)




























































Then, using the measurability conditions at t + 1, the de¯nitions of Qk
t+1, e Qk





























The ¯rst round budget constraint at t + 1 then follows from (A21) and the de¯nition of e At(st)
Since the sequence f»tg1
t=0 satis¯es the recursion































which con¯rms the transversality condition. The no lending conditions (23) imply for all st+1 that the
solvency constraints hold. Hence, the allocation is feasible and optimal for the household's at the derived
50prices and tax rates. The household's budget constraints and the resource constraint guarantee that the
government's budget constraints are satis¯ed. It is easy to verify that the derived choices of ¯rms satisfy
their ¯rst order conditions and are optimal. ¥
B. Complete Markets Problems
Here we derive some properties of the complete markets Ramsey problem. We begin with the Ramsey
problem from date 0 and then discuss a continuation problem from date 1.
A. Complete Markets Ramsey Problem












¯t´t(st)¼t(st) : U1t(st) ¡ U2t(st) ¸ 0; (B2)






















³0 : f0(s0)N10(s0)U10(s0) = »0(s0): (B5)
For i = 1;2, let Hit = ³0[U1itc1t + U1t + U2itc2t + Ulit¨t] + &tUlit©t. The ¯rst order condition for cit, t > 0,
is:
Uit + ´t[U1it ¡ U2it] ¡ Ât ¡ Hit = 0; (B6)
If U1t > U2t, then ´t = 0. (B6) then implies that U1t ¡U2t ¡H1t +H2t = 0: Under our assumed preferences,
H1t
U1t = H2t








From (B6) for i = 1;2 coupled with Ât > 0, we have that Hit
Uit 6= 1. But, then U1t = U2t, a contradiction. We
deduce that U1t = U2t, t > 0.




lt(st) = (1 ¡ ½)Lf;t(st) + ½Ls;t(st). The government's problem can be reformulated in terms of rt and lt.













t + (1 ¡ ½)
(1 ¡ ½) + ½rt
!)#
(B7)







t + (1 ¡ ½)









(1 ¡ ½) + ½rt
!#
+ Est¡1 [Ultlt] = Est¡1 [Ultlt]:
Combining this with (B5), we then have that any feasible allocation must satisfy:











Conversely, if an allocation satis¯es the previous equation, the no arbitrage conditions (B2), the resource
constraints
G(st) + c1t(st) + c2t(st) =
h





(1 ¡ ½) + ½rt(st)
l®
t (st); (B8)








(1 ¡ ½) + ½rt
!#
= 0; (B9)
then it is feasible. But setting rt = 1 satis¯es the sticky price constraints (B9) and relaxes the resource
constraints (B8). Thus, it is optimal to set rt to this value. Consequently, after date 0, Lf;t = Ls;t = lt and
the sticky price constraint can be dropped.











subject to U1 ¸ U2 and l® ¸ c1 +c2 +G(s). Hence, the optimal allocation at t depends on s and ³0. Denote
the optimal labor choice by l¤(s) and the optimal cash good choice by c¤
1(st) where the dependence on ³0 is
suppressed. Under the more speci¯c preferences (1 ¡ °)logc1 + ° logc2 + v(l), U1c1 + U2c2 + (¹=®)Ull® =
1 + (¹=®)v0(l)l®. Let F¤(s) = 1 + (¹=®)v0(l¤(s))l¤(s)®. With ³0 · 0, the ¯rst order conditions for l, c1 and
c2 immediately yield that if G(s) > G(s0), then l¤(s) > l¤(s0) and F¤(s0) > F¤(s). Additionally, since ¼ is
monotone, »t(st¡1;s0) > »t(st¡1;s), when »t is evaluated at the optimal allocation. Finally, it also follows








52B. Complete Markets Continuation Problem








¯tU(c1t+1;c2t+1;(1 ¡ ½)Lft+1 + ½Lst+1)
#
(B11)
subject to, for t > 0,
¯t´t(st)¼t(st) : U1t(st) ¡ U2t(st) ¸ 0; (B12)






















³1 : Á1(s0) = Es0[»1(s1)]: (B15)
In this problem the government selects a continuation allocation subject to the constraints above, and, in
particular, subject to the implementability constraint (B15). Arguments similar to those above can be used
to establish that 1) the Friedman rule holds at all dates, 2) Nt = 1 at all dates and that the sticky price
constraint (B14) is non-binding. This proves Proposition 3 in the text.
C. The role of the no lending constraint
Example Suppose the household's preferences are given by: (1 ¡ °)logc1 + ° logc2 + v(l), where v is
a decreasing, smooth, concave function. These preferences have the convenient feature that the value of
the government's primary surplus at each date, »t, is given by: »t(st) = Est
hP1
j=0 ¯jf1 ¡ v0(lt+j)¨t+jg
i





t=1 denote the allocation that solves
the complete markets continuation problem and let f»¤
t (st)g denote the corresponding sequence of primary
surplus values. Now turn to the economy with only non-contingent nominal debt of two period maturity,
but without lending restrictions. Fix an arbitrary st¡1, let s(st¡1) = argmaxs »¤
t (st¡1;s)=[U¤
1t(st¡1;s)]. Set




























to be supported in the economy with non-contingent nominal debt, it must be the case that this allocation,









Where in (62) we use the fact that fL¤
f;t;L¤
s;tg1




the optimal consumption allocation from the complete markets economy. The de¯nitions of at and b2
t in





t=1 and at and b2
t satisfy
the measurability condition (62) after histories (st¡1;s(st¡1)). However, for the other histories (st¡1;s),
s 6= s(st¡1), the measurability constraint may be violated since the Friedman rule, the de¯nition of s(st¡1)






















Suppose that the above inequality is strict and consider slightly raising credit good consumption and slightly






. If Xt(st¡1) is large, only a very small alteration
in the pattern of consumption will be required to equate [U2t(st¡1;s)b2
t(st¡1) + U1t(st¡1;s)at(st¡1)] to
»¤
t (st¡1;s). Consequently, by choosing the fXtg1
t=1 sequence appropriately, a government in an economy
with only non-contingent nominal debt markets can attain the labor allocation that is optimal and a con-
sumption allocation arbitrarily close to the optimal one in an economy with complete markets. Clearly, this
will require the government to lend an arbitrarily large amount of one period debt and borrow an arbitrarily
large amount of two period debt. ¥
D. An illustrative example
Proof of Lemma 4: First, we show that there exists a solution in which bK
1 > 0, then that there is a
solution in which a1 = 0, bk
1 = 0, k = 2;¢¢¢ ;K ¡ 1 and bK
1 > 0. Under our assumptions, in particular
our assumption that the household's utility function is continuously di®erentiable and that it's total labor
supply lies within the set [0;T], it may be shown that the set of feasible government choices is compact. The




optimal portfolio. Since Á1 > 0, either a¤
1 > 0 or bk¤
1 > 0 for some k. Let ^ k denote the smallest k such that
for all k > ^ k, bk¤
1 = 0. Suppose ^ k < K. Then, for t ¸ maxf2;^ kg, the ¯rst order condition for cit reduces to:
0 = Uit + ´t [U1it ¡ U2it] ¡ Ât ¡ Hit; (63)
54Suppose that U1t > U2t. Since under our assumed preferences, H1t
U1t = H2t






= 0: It may be veri¯ed that Ât > 0 and, from (63) with ´t = 0, that 1 ¡ H2t
U2t > 0. Thus, we
deduce that, in fact, U1t = U2t. It then follows from the measurability constraint that the optimal allocation





1 = 0 or, if ^ k = 1, bK
1 = a¤
1 and a1 = 0.
All other portfolio weights remain the same.
Wlog, assume that bK¤











































































































< 0, i;j = 1;2, i 6= j. Combining this, (65) and (64), we
obtain that U1t ¡ U2t > 0 if and only if ³1 < 0, and U1t ¡ U2t = 0 if and only if ³1 ¸ 0. Since, bK¤
1 > 0,
it follows from the ¯rst order conditions (41) that either A) ³1(s) = 0 for each s or B) ³1(s) > 0 > ³1(s0)
for some pair s, s0. Now suppose bk¤






U1j(s)¼(s) = 0. If












¼(s) > 0 (66)
But this contradicts the ¯rst order condition for bK¤
1 > 0. Thus, bk¤
1 = 0 for k < K. By a similar argument,
a¤
1 = 0 as well. Suppose that Case A holds. It follows that U1t
U2t = 1, t ¸ 1. The left hand side of the




1 + a1]U11(s)N1(s) and the maturity structure
is irrelevant. It follows that there is a solution to the government's problem in which a1 = 0, bk
1 = 0,
k = 2;¢¢¢ ;K ¡ 1 and bK
0 > 0 as required. ¥
55Proof of Lemma 6: Wlog, assume that bK¤
1 > 0 and a¤
1 and bk¤
1 , k = 2;¢¢¢ ;K ¡ 1, equal 0. From the
¯rst order condition for bK¤
1 , either ³1(s) = 0 for each s or ³1(s) > 0 > ³1(s0). We must rule out the ¯rst case.
So suppose it is true. Then from the proof of Lemma 4, Uct(s) := U1t(s) = U2t(s) each s and t. Additionally,
it can be shown that in this case, N1(s) = N1(s0). Consequently, for each s and t, Lf;t(s) = Ls;t(s) = Lt(s).
We can then re-express the government's choice problem as one involving only fct;Ltg1
t=1 and bK
1 , where







t (s) + Ult(s)®L
®¡1
t (s)) = 0 (67)
It follows that the optimal labor supply Lt(s) is increasing in the shadow price of resources Ât(s). Similarly,
inspection of the ¯rst order condition for consumption reveals that ct(s) is decreasing in Ât(s). It then
follows from the resource constraint L®











[Uct(s)ct(s) + Ult(s)Lt(s)]: (68)
But this violates the measurability constraints since when U1t(s) = U2t(s) = Uct(s) and Lf;t(s) = Ls;t(s) =







[Uct(s)ct(s) + Ult(s)Lt(s)]: ¥ (69)
Proof of Lemma 7 It follows from the proof of Lemma 4, that if s is such that ³1(s) ¸ 0 or if t ¸ K,
then U1t(s) = U2t(s) and Q1
t(s) = 1. On the other hand, if s is such that ³1(s) < 0 and if t = 2;¢¢¢ ;K ¡ 1,
then U1t(s) ¡ U2t(s) > 0 and Q1
t(s) < 1. Under the assumed preferences, Hit = 0, Uijt = 0, j 6= i.
Additionally, a1 = 0, bk
1 = 0, k = 2;¢¢¢ ;K ¡ 1 at the optimal allocation. Consequently, the ¯rst order
conditions for c1t and c2t, t 2 f2;¢¢¢ ;K ¡ 1g imply:














Also, Uiit=Uit = ¡diUit, where d1 = 1
1¡° and d2 = 1

















U11N1 = 0 (71)
Since ¯ 2 (0;1), and ³1 < 0, we deduce that for t = 2;¢¢¢ ;K ¡ 2,
U1t+1
U2t+1 > U1t
U2t. Hence, 1 > Q1
t > Q1
t+1,
for t = 2;¢¢¢ ;K ¡ 2. If Q1
1 = 1, we are ¯nished. Suppose this not the case. The household's ¯rst order
56conditions then imply:





























































We deduce that U1t
U2t > U11
U21, for t = 2;¢¢¢ ;K ¡ 1. Thus, Q1
t+1 < Q1
t for t = 1;¢¢¢ ;K ¡ 2. ¥
Notes
1The two are connected in the model via a risk-augmented Fisher equation.
2See Bohn (1988), Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2004) and Siu (2004) amongst others.
3Chari and Kehoe (1993) make the same assumption. Much of our analysis would continue to hold if government
lending was limited, rather than completely ruled out.
4We also restrict the government to using income taxation only. Correia et al (2002) have shown that if a
government can implement state contingent taxes on consumption as well as income, it can hedge ¯scal shocks and
replicate a complete markets allocation.
5Additionally, a substantial literature has documented the practice of adjusting the short term interest rate
gradually in response to shocks, see for example Sack (2000). Our optimal policy also incorporates elements of such
gradualism.
6The absence of two trading rounds in period 0 simpli¯es the analysis without loss of generality. We will call
the budget constraint in period 0 a second round budget constraint to be consistent with the labeling in subsequent
periods.
7Models with only the ¯rst stage of asset trading are said to exhibit Svensson timing. This timing convention
prevents households from adjusting their cash holdings in light of their current state-contingent cash needs. Models
with only the second stage of asset trading are said to exhibit Lucas timing. In our incomplete market model, this
timing convention restricts the government's ability to insure itself against shocks by forcing households and the
government to hold part of their portfolio in cash.
8At this stage one period bonds and money are equivalent: they are both claims to a unit of cash after the




9However, as described above, we assume that shoppers can buy goods from local stores on credit.
10Other weaker restrictions on household borrowing/government lending of the form B
k
t (s
t¡1) ¸ ¡B would lead
to qualitatively similar results.






t) are also associated with anticipated in°ations over the horizon t to t + k ¡ 1.
The household's ¯rst order conditions imply a risk-augmented Fisher equation: ¯Et[U1t+1=U1t]Et[Pt=Pt+1]Q
1
t +
57¯Covt[U1t+1=U1t;Pt=Pt+1] = 1 that links anticipated in°ations to reductions in one period debt prices and positive
nominal interest rates.
13In this model, the government possesses enough policy instruments to separate debt management from monetary
policy. As we discuss further below, optimal monetary policy will conform to the Friedman rule and U1t = U2t = Ut.





t), t > 0. The ft(s
t) terms appear in no other constraints and can be chosen to ensure that these constraints
hold at any desired allocation.
15Note that the assumption that claims are of only one period maturity ensures that continuation allocations from
period t+1 onwards do not a®ect the government's period t liability value. Thus, the period 1 continuation allocations
appear in the implementability constraint (29) only insofar as they in°uence the primary surplus value »0. Á1 is then
a su±cient state variable for Continuation Problem 2.
16See Appendix B for an example and further discussion.

































18The existence of optimal (summable) Lagrange multipliers is not essential for the argument. Weitzman
(1973) gives su±cient conditions for such existence in a related deterministic context.
19Speci¯cally, the general Theorem 2.2 of Kamihigashi (2003) can be specialized to this case.
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